

Drugs

NEW YORK TIMES

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Ambassadors Given Overseas Authority Over Drug Matters

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 17 — In an effort to strengthen the state department's hand in fighting the international drugs traffic and halt embarrassing interagency conflicts, the Government has issued new guidelines that give the United States Ambassador to each foreign country undisputed authority in narcotics matters.

This supplements a guideline issued in February, 1971, which established the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, an arm of the Justice Department, as the accredited agency to deal with drug law enforcement overseas. Other agencies, notably the Bureau of Customs, were told to restrict their foreign operations and work through the Justice Department bureau.

Now, according to State De-

partment officials, the bureau's preeminence abroad will be ended, and all agencies will be represented equally on committees in each country headed by coordinators named by the ambassadors.

Strategy Session Due

The move was made by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Nelson G. Gross, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, said that the new coordinators, from all foreign posts, would meet in Washington in two or three weeks to work out strategy.

The committee, which groups all the United States agencies involved in the problem, issued a candid report on world drug traffic yesterday, acknowledging that only "a small fraction" of the total international flow of illegal drugs was being stemmed by law-enforcement agencies.

The committee, including representatives of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs, the Customs Bureau, the Defense and Agriculture Departments and the Agency for International Development, acted in the wake of a series of incidents in Panama, Paraguay and Thailand in which United States Ambassadors had been criticized for slowness or ineffectiveness in narcotics matters.

17 August 1972

Victory over the CIA

Dear Sir:

Although one has the feeling that to respond to Nat Hentoff's recent column about Harper & Row allowing the CIA to see a book prior to publication (Voice, August 10) is only to encourage him to even more dubious efforts, the enormity of his assertions and their potential impact on the author community compel me to put Harper's side on the record at least once.

Stripped of its rhetoric, Hentoff's article boils down to the assertions that Harper & Row "surrendered" to "pressure" from the CIA by giving it the opportunity to see the book prior to publication (which Hentoff says is the same as giving them the power to revise it), and that the publisher unfairly persuaded the author into going along with its point of view despite his own feelings to the contrary.

Hentoff's claim that what is involved here is prior restraint is a classic exercise in bootstrap logic. Although he admits that the CIA's request (which he has apparently not seen, although everyone else has, and which is not, as he says, "confidential") is only for permission to review the book, he nevertheless asserts that "what the CIA is after, the wording of the letter makes clear, is permission to revise." Later in his article he escalates this to "an attempt at prior restraint (review)."

Since the real nature of the CIA's request (demand) is central to the issue, I will quote from it: "In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U. S. government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid . . . we believe that we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are dis-

torted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence."

Clearly what is involved here is not a threat but a request, not an attempt to revise but an offer to prove matters which, if they could be proven, might well lead both publisher and author to make changes of their own free will. To refuse even to entertain such an offer seems to us egoistic and irresponsible. We do not want to play God with men's lives, or even with their reputations. Although we have great confidence in the author and in the book, we do not find it utterly inconceivable that someone else may know something we don't. This is simply a matter of intellectual honesty; to convert it into some form of political surrender is an exercise in knee-jerk paranoia.

As everyone knows by now, the CIA did submit their comments, which we and the author carefully considered and rejected as wholly unpersuasive. The book is being published this week without a word changed. And yet Hentoff bristles at calling this a victory. We gave away, he says, a full adversary proceeding in a court of law which would have protected the author's rights and the public's as well. Yet it was just such a proceeding that we sought to avoid or, failing that, win, by making the book available voluntarily.

We are in the business of publishing books, not litigating with the CIA. Whatever it may do for the ego, such litigation is enormously expensive for both author and publisher, and it can tie up publication for months and even years. The CIA could commence an action whether we let them see the book or not, and the moment the issue was joined the Court could, and probably would, have let them see the book anyway. One of the reasons for volunteering the book was in the hope of avoiding such expense and delay by convincing the CIA that they had no case for court action. Another was to put us in the strongest possible position should the CIA go to court anyway, in which case we would have fought

them to the limit. It seems rather ungenerous to fault this strategy for having paid off, as it appears to have done.

But, says Hentoff, there is the "chilling effect" to consider. Just what got chilled in this case? What difference did it make that the CIA saw the book three weeks earlier than it otherwise would have? This is not a series of newspaper exposes where future sources might dry up. And the CIA can intimidate past sources just as well after publication as before, even assuming they need our copy of the manuscript to do it.

I am not saying there is no such thing as a "chilling effect." I am only saying that its importance must be judged on the circumstances of each individual case, and weighed in the balance against the danger of pursuing the opposite course. In this case I believe the danger of "chill" was much less than the danger of publishing serious allegations which might turn out to be unsupportable. I believe that the action of the Freedom to Read Committee, which Hentoff criticizes, was based on a recognition of the delicacy of this balance. Hentoff's simplistic analysis does not, of course, even admit the existence of the problem.

Finally, Hentoff scores Harper & Row for having successfully persuaded the author to go along with its point of view. It does not take much reading between the lines to perceive that what he really resents is the notion that a publisher should have a point of view on such a matter. Yet a publishing house is not a public utility like the telephone company, required by law to transmit messages for anyone who can pay the fare.

Many people associate the credibility of a work with the reputation of the publisher as well as with that of the author, and most are quick to hold the publisher to account when things go wrong. The Clifford Irving debacle is only one of several recent reminders of this fact of life. Surely the author has no more right to force the publisher to publish against his scruples than the publisher has to force the author to write against his.

In this case, the author had other equally attractive publishing options which did not involve showing the manuscript to the CIA. The fact that he chose to go along with us rather than publish elsewhere only reflects the fact that our commitment to the book was clearly more important to him than our difference of opinion about showing it to the CIA.

—B. Brooks Thomas
Vice President &
General Counsel
Harper & Row
East 53rd Street

Nat Hentoff will reply in next week's issue.

Dues.

17 AUG 1972

U.S. Officials See Signs of Progress In Stopping Drugs

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 15—In a document accompanying the State Department's drug survey, the Nixon Administration said today that despite pessimistic forecasts it was making substantial progress toward blocking the flow of heroin from abroad, toward enforcing domestic drug laws, and toward treating the victims of drug abuse.

The progress achieved in cutting off supplies is reflected, the document said, by sharply increased heroin prices in the eastern United States. In Boston, for instance, the cost of one gram of heroin jumped from \$418 to \$785 in the last 12 months, while in Baltimore, the price of a bag of heroin—a single dose—rose from \$10 to \$15, the document said.

Progress May Be Temporary

The document noted, however, that the "heroin drought" might be temporary because "some of the heroin which formerly supplied our troops in Vietnam is now being directed towards addicts in this country."

The achievements of law-enforcement authorities in combating drugs were summarized as follows:

¶Domestic seizures of heroin by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and by United States Customs increased from 1,161 pounds in the fiscal year ended in June, 1971, to 1,626 pounds in the fiscal year that ended in June, 1972. The bureau estimates American heroin use at 12,000 to 20,000 pounds annually.

¶Arrests by the Federal drug agency and by Customs rose from 12,947 in 1971 to 16,144 in this last fiscal year.

¶The office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, which is aimed at street-level pushers, has established task forces in 34 cities since Jan. 28. Agents made more than 1,000 arrests and identified about 3,000 pushers.

¶The Internal Revenue Service went after top narcotics wholesalers through income-tax investigations. In the first year of its special drive against the big operators, who usually keep in the background, the Federal taxmen seized \$9.9-million in currency and property.

In Vietnam, the document noted, drug abuse—which in 1971 ran as high as 5 or 6 per cent in some units—had declined to 1.8 per cent, according to urinalysis tests as of July 1, 1972.

17 AUG 1972

NARCOTICS STUDY BY U.S. CONCEDES PROBLEM IS HUGE

Only 'Small Fraction' of the
Illicit Flow Is Seized,
Cabinet Panel Finds

WORLD TRAFFIC TRACED

International Crime Rings
Said to Reap Big Profits
—New York Key Point

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 —

The Government, in an unusually candid report on worldwide drug traffic, said today that despite increased enforcement efforts the United States and other countries were able to seize only "a small fraction" of the total illegal flow of heroin.

The 111-page survey, under preparation for nine months by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which groups all the United States agencies involved in the problem, surveyed the world scene. The picture that emerged was anything but encouraging.

The report noted that New York was the main distribution point for heroin smuggled into the United States from Europe. [Details on Page 16.]

The report noted that on enforcement efforts in the last two years had led to mounting seizures, but it concluded that "the rising level of seizures still represents only a small fraction of the illicit flow."

"The international heroin market almost certainly continues to have adequate supplies to meet the demand in consuming countries," it said.

High Profits are Noted

The report, "World Opium survey 1972," the most comprehensive of its kind, noted that international criminal

"cartels" seemed to control the wholesale opium and heroin trade, and apparently reaped "high rates of return on their investment."

As an example of the illegal profits made in the heroin trade, the report said that on an investment of \$120,000 to \$300,000, French Corsicans, who it said run the European trade, normally receive about \$1-million from dealers in New York for 100 kilograms of heroin. A kilogram is 2.2 pounds.

And then, on street sale in New York, a kilogram of pure heroin would sell for \$200,000 — or \$22-million for 100 kilograms, the report said.

The report was put together by the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Customs Bureau, and the Treasury. It was completed in July and released by the State Department after a meeting at the White House, this morning of the Cabinet committee, which is headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

Efforts Are Described

Perhaps to counter the discouraging tone of the report, the State Department also released a "fact sheet" describing efforts by the Administration to counter what President Nixon has called "America's public enemy No. 1."

The report included comments, often caustic or uncomplimentary, about many nations with which the United States has friendly relations.

Success in developing international policing organizations has been slow, the report said, "largely because of widely varying national attitudes toward the drug problem."

These differences "are regularly and skillfully exploited by the illicit international trafficker," it said.

It noted that efforts were underway to curtail the growing of the opium poppy—the source of heroin—but that because of local conditions these programs "are unlikely to be successful unless accompanied by serious changes in a number of long-standing social and economic traditions."

The report said that a minimum of 200 tons of illegal opium were available for the international market in 1971 and, in addition, "there were undoubtedly substantial stocks available in the form of raw

and processed opium, morphine base, and heroin held by growers, processors, or traffickers."

In 1971, total seizures amounted to 21.6 tons of opium equivalent, and the seizures in the first quarter of this year reached 9 tons.

The report was released the day before Harper & Row is publishing a controversial book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," by Alfred W. McCoy. It charges that the C.I.A. and other United States agencies for political reasons supported Asians involved in drug trade.

When this was pointed out to a ranking State Department official later, he maintained that the dual publication was "purely coincidental." He said the Government report had been "in the works" for a long time, and had received its final approval this morning at the White House meeting.

The Government report described in some detail how illicit opium and its derivatives — mainly heroin — were marketed. It said "the primary complex," which leads to the largest deliveries to the United States, begins in Turkey, encompasses many countries in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere and terminates in the United States.

A second complex is the Southeast Asian market — with the opium grown in the "golden triangle" of Burma, Thailand and Laos. This complex serves mostly addicts and users in the area. The report said that the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam had hurt production.

A third complex, composed of India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, also serves addicts in the area, mostly in Iran, but the report said the second and third complexes "are of interest also because of their potential for becoming important suppliers of opium for the international heroin market, in the future, particularly is the primary complex factors."

Describing how the illegal drugs move to markets, the report said the smuggler's methods "are limited only by the scope of his imagination."

It said that the most popular method of smuggling opium and morphine base from Turkey into Western Europe, for manufacture into heroin, is the use of "specially constructed compartments or 'traps' built into passenger cars, commercial trucks, and touring buses."

"Much of the morphine base is concealed in trucks carrying bonded consignments of legitimate cargo which has been sealed with a customs stamp," it said. "These sealed trucks

operating under international customs arrangements, will usually be allowed to travel across various national frontiers with little or no controls. The great number of such trucks traveling into Western Europe precludes any systematic inspection."

The smuggling by sea, less popular now than several years ago, "still accounts for a large amount of narcotics entering France," while smuggling by air is "the least favored smuggling method," the report said.

The route taken from Turkey overland passes through Bulgaria or Greece to Yugoslavia. From there, the drugs are taken either to West Germany through Austria or to France through Italy.

"The most common entry points for narcotics transported by ships are Marseilles, Barcelona, Venice, Trieste, Genoa, and Naples, and to a lesser extent, Bari, Brindist and Piraeus," it said.

The greatest change in smuggling patterns, the report said, is that West Germany has become "a major opium and morphine base storage depot and staging area."

Latin Route Developing

Once in France, the morphine base is refined into heroin by small, mobile laboratories.

"The French heroin traffic is believed to be dominated by a few large trafficking groups," the report said. "The most common factor in virtually every major trafficking group over the last 20 years is the preponderance of French Corsicans. It is this ethnic group above all others that has controlled the heroin traffic in France."

The heroin is then smuggled into the United States either directly from France, often

concealed in cars or unaccompanied baggage, or through third countries.

"Since 1969, heroin smuggled via the Latin American route has accounted for about one-third of the seizures," the report said. "Although little is known about French-Latin American connections, it appears that well-organized smuggling rings in Latin America purchase large quantities of heroin from French traffickers and then arrange for its transport and sale to the United States. Many of the leaders of these Latin-American groups are ethnic French Corsicans."

and ethnic Italians who have close ties with their countrymen in Europe."

French heroin is believed to enter Latin America mostly through Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and much of the traffic to the United States passes through Panama, "which has long served as a convenient refueling and transshipment point."

Sizable amounts have also been sent to the United States through Mexico, "and recently the importance of this route may have increased," the report said.

Canada also has become a major transit stop for drugs to the United States, the report said.

In Southeast Asia, the report said, until the United States servicemen market developed, sales to non-Asians were very small. But in 1970 and 1971, Southeast Asian dealers "produced large quantities of white, high-quality heroin for the U.S. servicemen market in Vietnam."

After June 1971, with the start of the withdrawal of American troops, the market declined sharply.

In an appendix, the report summarized the traffic in countries and areas. These included the following:

Turkey

Turkey is the largest source of the raw material for the heroin sold on the American market. Turkish opium is preferred by heroin traffickers because the morphine content is one of the highest in the world, ranging from 9 to 14 per cent. Because of this, legal prices for Turkey's opium exports far surpass those of other countries. The report noted Turkey's decision to ban the legal production of opium, in the hope this would also mean the end of the illegal production. But it said that "there will still be a need for vigorous law enforcement against smugglers if the flow of illegal opium is to be slowed after 1972, when production is banned. This is true because of the likelihood that illegal stocks may be stored in Turkey."

"A large network exists in Turkey to collect, and in some cases, process and smuggle the opium out of the country."

Afghanistan

Opium production in Afghanistan is all illegal, but about 100 tons is produced each year, because the royal government "is simply unable to provide adequate enforcement." The report said that an effective enforcement program is blocked because in some areas opium is the only cash crop, and some tribes, like the Pathans, "enjoy special privileges, such as exemption from taxes and conscription." It said,

The king regards these tribes as an important pillar and will not wish to antagonize them."

Iran

Iran is a major customer of illegal Afghan opium exports for some 400,000 addicts, a drop from the peak of 1.5-million before a ban on opium was instituted in 1955, the report said. But even with this total, Iran is among the world's leading consumers of narcotics. By comparison, there are estimated to be 560,000 heroin addicts in the United States.

Pakistan

The illegal opium production in Pakistan ranges between 32 tons and 170 tons a year, all of it in the North West frontier Province. Most of this is sold in Iran also. The report noted that the Pakistani Government had expressed a willingness to combat illegal opium growing, but the report said this "will be a difficult problem."

"The new administration will be reluctant to risk antagonizing the tribal peoples with an opium eradication plan," it said, noting that Pakistani officials believed that opium consumption was a minor problem.

India

India is the world's largest producer of legal opium, and when Turkey ends its production of legal opium, will have a virtual monopoly in this field. But it is also estimated that 100 tons a year end up in the illegal market, although most of it is consumed in India itself.

Burma

Burma produces about 400 tons a year, and is the largest single producer for overseas markets. The Government does not regard the matter as serious and refuses to participate in international control bodies.

The Burmese traffic is controlled largely by Chinese, many of them former members of Nationalist Chinese forces that retreated in Burma after the victory of the communists. Most of the opium produced in northern Burma and northwest Thailand is processed in refineries within an area of about 650 square miles at the junction of the borders of Burma, Thailand and Laos. This area, the report said, "is the heart of the Southeast Asian narcotics trade."

From this "golden triangle" the heroin sold to American servicemen apparently originated. The report said that the abilities of the area supply large quantities of processed opium and heroin "remain unimpaired."

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Laos

Most of the 100 tons of opium produced in Laos is consumed there, and since 1971, production has been diminished. The principal problem in Laos "is essentially one of preventing opium originating in other countries, primarily Burma, from transiting Laos on the way to South Vietnam or other countries."

Hong Kong

The report said that Hong Kong was a major consumer of opium and heroin and also an important processing and transit point.

Operators of heroin refineries in Hong Kong have elaborate and largely successful security precautions, the report said. The general public in Hong Kong is "apathetic" about the problem and it is hard to get the courts and juries to hand out stiff sentences, the report said.

China

The report said that despite China's long association with opium, there was "no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned the illicit export of opium and its derivatives nor are there any indications of government participation in the opium trade of Southeast Asia and adjacent markets."

France

France was praised for increasing her attention to the drug problem, after long believing that publicity would only contribute to the spread of drugs. The report said that although addiction was less serious in France than in the United States, there had been a sharp increase in heroin use. But despite the stepped-up enforcement, France was estimated by the report to be responsible for 80 per cent of the American heroin.

West Germany

Because it has become a way station for Turkish morphine base, the drug problem has increased in West Germany, the report said. Much of the smuggling is done by the large numbers of Turks and other Middle Easterners working in Germany. The report said that "enforcement efforts have been substantially increased but are still hampered by Germany's constitutionally decentralized police system and a need for more specialized training in narcotics enforcement techniques."

Italy

Italy also serves as a transit country and "some organized groups of Mafiosi remain in close liaison with their Corsican counterparts and the American Mafia in the international traffic in heroin," the report said. A crackdown on the Mafiosi has been under way, it said, "but the arrests appear to have involved only minor figures."

Panama

Panama was described as a long-time "staging area for contraband American cigarettes and other goods bound for Latin America." Because of the heavy ship traffic in the canal, and the air traffic at its airport, control of smuggling "is a formidable task."

"Countless pilots have loaded their planes with contraband whisky and cigarettes from Panama's free-port areas and flown them to South America," the report said. In the past, the planes would usually return to Panama empty; now many return with cocaine from the Andean countries and with heroin that has been smuggled into Latin America from Europe. The drugs are flown to Miami or elsewhere in the United States, sometimes by way of Mexico. In recent years, some of the cocaine has been shipped from Panama to Europe in exchange for heroin, which is ultimately smuggled into the United States."

Other Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, as well as Caribbean Islands, were cited as transit points also. It said that drug abuse in Latin America continues to rise and the flow of narcotics from and through the region to the United States "continues unabated."


Mexico

The report estimated that 25 per cent of the heroin moved into the United States is from Mexico. It said an important route is Route 15 which runs northward along the western coast of Mexico. The heroin is brought across the border in cars, or sometimes in light planes or fishing boats.


"The profits are so enormous—up to \$50,000 for a single trip—that there is no shortage of entrepreneurs," the report said.

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
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THE TURKEY-US NETWORK**Opium and Morphine Base Movement from Turkey to W. Europe**

The three maps on this page—showing the movement of illicit drugs—and the two tables on production and prices were adapted from the official United States Government report "World Opium Survey 1972," which was prepared over nine months under the auspices of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control.

Heroin Movement Routes from Europe to the United States

The Southeast Asia Illicit Opium Network




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Harper & Row announces publication of "THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA"



HARPER & ROW is publishing this week a brilliant and controversial study of the international narcotics traffic and the role played in it by agencies of the U.S. Government, including the CIA. The book is **THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**. The principal author is Alfred W. McCoy,* a twenty-seven year old graduate student in history at Yale University.

In early June 1972 Mr. McCoy testified on the general subject matter of his book before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (better known as the Proxmire Committee). Shortly thereafter, the CIA asked Harper & Row for an opportunity to read Mr. McCoy's manuscript prior to publication. The CIA stated that:

*with Cathleen B. Read
and Leonard P. Adams II

"In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. Government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid.*** We believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this Agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are distorted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence."

continued

We have worked closely with Mr. McCoy in the preparation of the book. We have asked for, and the author has supplied us with, documentation for every material allegation of a controversial nature contained in the work (there are 63 pages of footnotes supporting a text of 383 pages). In addition the book has been read by independent authorities. As a result, we are convinced that the work is carefully reasoned, scholarly, and well documented.

However, in view of the serious nature of the charges made, we believed and still believe the CIA deserved the opportunity to demonstrate to us that certain of Mr. McCoy's statements are "totally false and without foundation." We further believed that they should have this opportunity before the book was published and while there was still time to avoid what could conceivably be irreparable damage to innocent persons.

Accordingly, and with the consent of the author, we made the book available to the CIA under certain agreed conditions. We told them that we would consider any factual inaccuracies which they might wish to point out to us, *but that we and the author would be the sole judges of whether changes would be made.* We made clear that our right to publish could not, and would not, be infringed. The CIA accepted these conditions.

At the end of the stipulated seven-day period the CIA delivered eight pages of written comments on the book. Although no specific factual errors were cited, some of Mr. McCoy's sources were questioned and the veracity of others flatly contradicted. We carefully reviewed these charges with the author, again going over the notes of his various interviews and other source material. Our confidence in the quality of the book was reaffirmed. We concluded that changes were neither necessary nor appropriate. We so informed the CIA, carefully documenting our reasons for not accepting each of the points made by them.

Thus THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA is being published without a single change. And we have given the CIA a fair opportunity to support their claim that the book is based upon inadequate scholarship. We believe that we have acted responsibly, in the best interests of all concerned, including the American reading public.

Winthrop Knowlton

President
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia—Illustrated, \$10.95 at bookstores